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about the nature of life and biology (‘mechanicism’), to the internal workings of a machine-like structure
(‘machine mechanism’), or to the causal explanation of a particular phenomenon (‘causal mechanism’). In
this paper I trace the conceptual evolution of ‘mechanism’ in the history of biology, and I examine how
the three meanings of this term have come to be featured in the philosophy of biology, situating the new
‘mechanismic program’ in this context. I argue that the leading advocates of the mechanismic program
(i.e., Craver, Darden, Bechtel, etc.) inadvertently conﬂate the different senses of ‘mechanism’. Speciﬁcally,
they all inappropriately endow causal mechanisms with the ontic status of machine mechanisms, and
this invariably results in problematic accounts of the role played by mechanism-talk in scientiﬁc practice.
I suggest that for effective analyses of the concept of mechanism, causal mechanisms need to be distin-
guished from machine mechanisms, and the new mechanismic program in the philosophy of biology
needs to be demarcated from the traditional concerns of mechanistic biology.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences‘Biological Mechanism is committed logically to a great deal
more than is commonly supposed.’ (Broad, 1925, pp. 91–92)1. Introduction
The concept of mechanism has recently received a great deal of
attention in the philosophy of science. The main catalyst for this
new interest has been the realization that scientists, especially
biologists, often refer to mechanisms in their inquiries into the
phenomena they investigate. This has led to the development of
a lively philosophical research program over the past decade that
has attempted to make sense of scientists’ ‘mechanism-talk’ and
elucidate the role it plays in scientiﬁc practice. The standard philo-
sophical strategy has been to begin by offering a general character-
ization of ‘mechanism’ that captures the way scientists use this
word, and then show the ways in which mechanisms are involved
in the explanation of phenomena. The mechanism account that has
exerted the greatest inﬂuence in the development of this new dis-
course has been formulated by Machamer, Darden, and Craver
(2000). Machamer et al. (MDC, hereafter) conceive mechanismsll rights reserved.as ‘entities and activities organized such that they are productive
of regular changes from start or set-up conditions to ﬁnish or ter-
mination conditions’ (MDC, 2000, p. 3). Glennan (2002) and Bech-
tel (2006) have also developed their own mechanism accounts.
Glennan deﬁnes a mechanism for a behaviour as ‘a complex system
that produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts,
where the interactions between parts can be characterized by di-
rect, invariant, change-relating generalizations’ (Glennan, 2002, p.
S344), whereas Bechtel characterizes a mechanism as ‘a structure
performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component
operations, and their organization’, adding that ‘The orchestrated
functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phe-
nomena’ (Bechtel, 2006, p. 26).
This emerging mechanism movement aims to provide a new
framework in which to tackle a number of classic problems in
the philosophy of science. Central among them is the nature of
explanation, in which a focus on mechanisms is deemed to consti-
tute an effective antidote to the outmoded deductive-nomological
conception of explanation inherited from logical empiricism. In
addition, recent literature in the philosophy of science includes
mechanism-based accounts of causation (Machamer, 2004),
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Darden, 2007; Glennan, 2005a), and reasoning in discovery (Bechtel,
2009; Darden, 2006). Moreover, it has been suggested that think-
ing about mechanisms may help resolve the problem of underde-
termination (Glennan, 2005a, pp. 458–459), as well as render
unnecessary discussions of laws (Glennan, 2002, p. S348; MDC,
2000, pp. 7–8) and theories (MDC, 2000, pp. 16–17). Nevertheless,
despite the general applicability of mechanism-based philosophy
of science, it is interesting to note that this research program has
developed primarily within the philosophy of biology. Indeed, the
most prominent defences and extensive elaborations of the mech-
anism approach have been advanced by philosophers interested in
the life sciences, with book-length mechanism accounts now exist-
ing for several biological subdisciplines, including cell biology
(Bechtel, 2006), molecular biology (Darden, 2006), and neurosci-
ence (Craver, 2007). This partnership between mechanism-based
philosophy and biology is no mere happenstance. In fact, I will
show that attending to the role the concept of mechanism has
played in the development of biological thought opens up a rich
new perspective in which to effectively examine and critically
evaluate the recent mechanism discourse.
In a nutshell, what a historically informed perspective reveals is
that the term ‘mechanism’ has come to be used in biology in a
number of different senses. As the new mechanism discourse pro-
ceeds with an almost complete disregard for how the concept of
mechanism has been shaped by the history of its usage, current
discussions frequently suffer from the inadvertent conﬂation of
the different meanings of the term. Admittedly, philosophers are
generally aware that ‘mechanism’ is a convoluted concept with a
long history, as evidenced by MDC’s assertion that ‘What counts
as a mechanism in science has developed over time and presum-
ably will continue to do so’ (MDC, 2000, p. 2). However, most of
them deem the potential for semantic confusion minimal because
they consider the various meanings of the concept to be neatly
associated with discrete, non-overlapping historical periods.
Craver (2007, p. 3), for instance, remarks: ‘Butwhat is amechanism?
History cannot answer this question. The term mechanism has
been used in too many different ways, and most of those uses no
longer have any application in biology’. This paper will demon-
strate, in opposition to this claim, how an awareness of the seman-
tic breadth of the concept of mechanism afforded by an
examination of its history can help uncover a number of important
tensions within the new mechanism discourse, as well as provide
the necessary philosophical resources for resolving them.
I begin by distinguishing and characterizing the three meanings
of the concept of mechanism in biology (Section 2). I then explore
the way in which the different senses of ‘mechanism’ have been
used in the history of biology (Section 3), and how they have come
to be featured in the philosophical literature, situating the new
mechanism discourse in this context (Section 4). Following this, I
illustrate the various problems that arise in recent discussions from
the inadvertent conﬂation of the different senses of ‘mechanism’
(Section 5). Finally, I show what amendments need to be made to
current accounts of mechanism to effectively capture the way this
concept is used by biologists in their research (Section 6).
2. The three meanings of ‘mechanism’ in biology
The term ‘mechanism’ is used to mean different things in differ-
ent contexts. In biology, ‘mechanism’ has three distinct meanings,
which can be distinguished and deﬁned as follows:
(a) Mechanicism: The philosophical thesis that conceives living
organisms as machines that can be completely explained
in terms of the structure and interactions of their component
parts.(b) Machine mechanism: The internal workings of a machine-like
structure.
(c) Causal mechanism: A step-by-step explanation of the mode
of operation of a causal process that gives rise to a phenom-
enon of interest.
As this taxonomy illustrates, ‘mechanism’ may refer to (a) a philo-
sophical thesis about the nature of life and biology, (b) the work-
ings of a machine, and (c) a particular mode of explanation. In
order to make the ensuing discussion as clear as possible, I will
refrain from using the word ‘mechanism’ in favour of these three
terms, employing it only when referring to the word itself and
not to any of its meanings. Let us now examine each of the three
senses of ‘mechanism’ in more detail.
Mechanicism (often called mechanistic philosophy or mechanical
philosophy) has its roots in the natural philosophy that emerged
from the work and ideas of Galileo Galilei, René Descartes, Pierre
Gassendi, Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton and others during the Scien-
tiﬁc Revolution. This philosophy is usually associated with a natu-
ralistic, atomistic, and deterministic view of nature that tends to
lend itself to mathematical characterization. However, biological
mechanicism, or mechanistic biology, has a rather more speciﬁc
meaning (cf. Allen, 2005; Bertalanffy, 1952; Broad, 1925; Dupré,
2007; Haldane, 1929; Lewontin, 2000; Loeb, 1912; Monod, 1977;
Rosen, 1991; Woodger, 1929). It can be characterized in terms of
the following key tenets:
1. The commitment to an ontological continuity between the liv-
ing and the nonliving, exempliﬁed by the quintessential mech-
anistic conception of organisms as machines, analogous and
comparable to man-made artefacts
2. The view that biological wholes (i.e., organisms) are directly
determined by the activities and interactions of their compo-
nent parts, and that consequently all properties of organisms
can be characterized from the bottom up in increasing levels
of complexity
3. The focus on the efﬁcient and material causes of organisms, and
the unequivocal repudiation of ﬁnal causes in biological
explanation
4. The commitment to reductionism in the investigation and
explanation of living systems
Mechanicism has been one of the most inﬂuential schools of bio-
logical thought since the late seventeenth century. It has its origins
in the physiological writings of Descartes, though the doctrine has
had numerous incarnations through the centuries. Some of the
most illustrious biologists of the past three hundred and ﬁfty years
have developed their ideas within a mechanistic framework.
Famous mechanistic biologists include Giovanni Borelli, Stephen
Hales, Antoine Lavoisier, François Magendie, Emil du Bois-Rey-
mond, Hermann von Hemholtz, Carl Ludwig, Wilhelm Roux, and
Jacques Loeb. In modern times, the astounding successes of molec-
ular biology have served to consolidate mechanicism as one of the
central philosophies of life and biology. Most recently, the emerg-
ing ﬁeld of synthetic biology, with its aim to apply engineering
principles in order to design and manufacture living cells from
scratch, constitutes the newest expression of the mechanistic
research program in biology.
The machine mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’ is the closest to
the etymological roots of the word, which can be traced to the La-
tin machina and the Greek mechane, terms meaning ‘machine’ or
‘mechanical contrivance’. The notion of machine mechanism has
traditionally been employed by biologists to describe machine-like
systems, or rather, systems conceived in mechanical terms; that is,
as stable assemblies of interacting parts arranged in such a way
that their combined operation results in predetermined outcomes.
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organisms in explicit analogy with the paradigmatic machine
mechanism of the age, be it a seventeenth-century clock with its
ﬁnely-tuned parts operating as a functionally-integrated whole,
an eighteenth-century steam-engine consuming chemically-bound
energy by combustion and performing work whilst releasing heat,
or a twentieth-century computer with its inbuilt program capable
of processing information about the environment and responding
accordingly. Machine mechanisms, biological and technological,
can be studied in isolation and are often decomposable into smal-
ler machine mechanisms.
The causal mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’, in contrast to the
ﬁrst two, only acquired widespread currency in biology in the
twentieth century, though it is the usage of the term that has be-
come predominant today. Causal mechanisms are of fundamental
importance in scientiﬁc practice because they enable the identiﬁ-
cation of causal relations. To inquire about the causal mechanism
of P (where P is the phenomenon of interest) is to inquire about
the causes that explain how P is brought about.1 Although the
majority of philosophers conceive causal mechanisms as real things
in the world (akin to machine mechanisms), I will be arguing in this
paper that they are actually better understood as heuristic models
which target speciﬁc causal relations and thereby facilitate the
explanation of the particular phenomena scientists investigate.
I am not, of course, the ﬁrst to propose that the concept of
mechanism needs to be terminologically fragmented to reﬂect its
semantic breadth. In fact, the word ‘mechanicism’ as I have deﬁned
it above has had longstanding currency in the German (‘mechani-
zismus’), French (‘mécanicisme’), Italian (‘meccanicismo’), and Span-
ish (‘mecanicismo’) scholarly literature, where it is commonly used
to demarcate this sense of ‘mechanism’ from the machine mecha-
nism and causal mechanism senses, but for some reason the term
has not caught on in the English-speaking world. However, Allen
(2005) has recently distinguished between the mechanicism sense
(which he calls ‘philosophical Mechanism’) and the causal mecha-
nism sense (which he calls ‘explanatory mechanism’), though he
does not discern the machine mechanismmeaning of ‘mechanism’.
On the other hand, Ruse (2005) has distinguished between the ma-
chine mechanism and causal mechanism senses (designating the
former ‘mechanism in the speciﬁc sense’ and the latter ‘mechanism
in the general sense’), but he fails to acknowledge the mechanicism
meaning. So although previous attempts have been made to distin-
guish the various senses of ‘mechanism’, these efforts have tended
to only discriminate two of the three meanings of the concept.
Consequently, a tripartite distinction such as the one I have pro-
posed in this section is needed to recognize the full semantic
breadth of the concept of mechanism.
Proponents of the new mechanism movement may object that
such convoluted distinctions are not really necessary, as at least
in present philosophical discussions the term ‘mechanism’ is em-
ployed consistently. The reality, however, is that it is not uncom-
mon to come across instances in the new mechanism discourse
in which the concept is used in different senses, sometimes even1 Interestingly, the machine mechanism and causal mechanism senses of ‘mechanism’ ar
rotary mechanism of ATP synthase’, ‘mechanism’ is used in the machine mechanism sense t
speak of ‘the mechanism of ATP synthesis’, ‘mechanism’ is employed in the causal mecha
responsible for the generation of ATP.
2 In addition to conﬂating two senses of ‘mechanism’, this passage is historically ina
intelligent design because in its original formulation the mechanistic view of the world as
has had important repercussions for biology. As Broad (1925, p. 91) recognized, ‘Biological
held without an elaborate Deistic theory about the origin of organisms. This is because Bio
self-regulating machines. These, so far as we can see, neither do arise nor could have arisen
in the next section, it is only with the widespread acceptance of Darwin’s theory of evolu
3 Jacques Monod, one of the founding fathers of molecular biology, captures the distinc
properties, by the microscope clockwork function that establishes between DNA and prote
obviously deﬁes ‘dialectical’ description. It is not Hegelian at all, but thoroughly Cartesianin the same passage. For example, consider the following remark
by Craver and Darden (2005, p. 234):
From the perspective of biology [. . .] one might tell a triumphal
story of the success of mechanism [i.e., mechanicism] over vari-
ous forms of vitalism, as well as over biological theories appeal-
ing to intelligent design. Indeed, one cannot open a journal in
any ﬁeld of contemporary biology without encountering
appeals to the mechanism [i.e., causal mechanism] for this or
that phenomenon.2
One ﬁnal terminological distinction is in order before moving on. It
has become customary, following Skipper and Millstein’s (2005)
analysis, to refer to the recent mechanism discourse as ‘the new
mechanistic philosophy’. This is a very unfortunate and rather mis-
leading designation, as it suggests that the new philosophical inter-
est in the concept of mechanism represents some sort of
continuation of mechanistic philosophy (i.e., mechanicism), which
is not in fact the case. Mechanistic philosophy, both as a general
doctrine and speciﬁcally as it applies to biology, is concerned with
the characterization of machine mechanisms. The new mechanism
discourse, in contrast, is devoted to examining the role played by
causal mechanisms in scientiﬁc practice. The new mechanism dis-
course is not committed to a mechanistic worldview, nor does it
prescribe a mechanistic approach in biology. In fact, there is nothing
distinctivelymechanistic about the newmechanism discourse, other
than its focus on ‘mechanisms’; and even this is not something it
really shares with mechanicism given that each research program
understands this concept in a different sense (see Fig. 1). Still, many
contemporary philosophers of science routinely refer to explana-
tions appealing to causal mechanisms as ‘mechanistic’, despite
these generally having nothing to do with classic mechanistic
explanations. Mechanistic explanations are ones in which wholes
are accounted for in terms of the structure and interactions of their
parts. Thus, to explain a system mechanistically is to explain it as
one explains a machine mechanism; i.e., to explain the way in
which the component parts of the system determine the properties
and activities of the whole. However, it is increasingly the case that
philosophers employ the term ‘mechanistic’ simply as a synonym
for ‘causal’ when characterizing scientiﬁc explanations. This is
regrettable because it blurs the longstanding tradition in biology
of using ‘mechanistic’ to refer to the ontological and epistemologi-
cal commitments of mechanicism (such as in the title of Jacques
Loeb’s seminal manifesto, The mechanistic conception of life), which
remain at the heart of contemporary disciplines like molecular biol-
ogy.3 Consequently, for the sake of consistency it would be prefera-
ble to avoid the term ‘mechanistic’ altogether in discussions of
causal mechanisms. In place of Skipper and Millstein’s misleading
banner, I will hereafter refer to the new mechanism movement in
the philosophy of science as the mechanismic program, and to expla-
nations given in terms of causal mechanisms as mechanismic expla-
nations, retaining the word ‘mechanistic’ for discussions of
mechanicism and machine mechanisms. This seems more appropri-
ate, given that the term ‘mechanismic’ is already widely used ine sometimes invoked in the same context. For example, when biologists speak of ‘the
o draw attention to the engine-like structure of the enzyme. However, when biologists
nism sense to describe the sequence of steps involved in the chemiosmotic process
ccurate. Mechanicism cannot be contrasted historically with theories appealing to
a machine mechanism necessarily presupposed the existence of a Divine Creator. This
Mechanism [i.e., mechanicism] about the developed organism cannot consistently be
logical Mechanism is a theory of the organism based on its analogy to self-acting and
without design and deliberate interference by someone with matter’. As I will discuss
tion that mechanistic biology became completely secularized.
tively mechanistic mindset of this discipline in his characterization of the cell: ‘By its
in, as between organism and medium, an entirely one-way relationship, this system
: the cell is indeed a machine’ (Monod, 1977, p. 108).
Mechanismic Program 
Mechanicism 
(Mechanistic Philosophy) Machine Mechanisms 
Causal Mechanisms 
examines
examines
Fig. 1. Relationship between the different meanings of ‘mechanism’
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ences (e.g., Bunge, 1997; Falleti & Lynch, 2009; Gerring, 2007; Nor-
kus, 2005).4
3. The conceptual evolution of ‘mechanism’ in biology
Darden (2006, p. 289, fn. 5) has noted that ‘The history of the
usage of the concept of mechanism from the seventeenth century
to molecular biology has yet to be written’. It would be impossible
to provide a comprehensive account of this history in the present
paper. Instead, I will restrict myself in this section to indicating
what I take to be the critical episodes in that history which resulted
in the semantic fragmentation of ‘mechanism’.
The ﬁrst two senses of ‘mechanism’ I distinguished, mechan-
icism and machine mechanism, can be traced back to the natural
philosophy of the seventeenth century. Mechanicism in its ﬁrst for-
mulations was intertwined with natural theology, given that the
mechanistic understanding of the universe as intricate clockwork
(i.e., as a machine mechanism) necessarily implied a Divine Crea-
tor. As a result, all things in nature, including organisms, became
conceived as complex assemblages of machinery created by an
intelligent Designer. It is this mechanistic understanding of life
which enabled the notion of machine mechanism to be employed
beyond the realm of technological artefacts in explicitly biological
contexts. For the mechanistic biologist, living systems are not just
composed of machine mechanisms; they are themselves machine
mechanisms. Indeed, allusions to the ‘mechanism of the body’
are commonplace throughout the history of physiology.
With Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection,
it became possible to naturalistically explain the complex adapta-
tions of organisms without needing to appeal to a Divine Creator.
One of the implications of Darwin’s theory was that its evolution-
ary understanding of organisms seemed to be at odds with the
engineering-based conception of life of mechanicism, exempliﬁed
by its postulation of biological machine mechanisms. Therefore,
to uncover the semantic evolution of the concept of mechanism,
it is necessary to consider two key questions:
(a) What happened to the notion of machine mechanism in
biology after Darwin?
(b) When and why did the notion of causal mechanism become
pervasive in biology?
Ruse (2005) has actually provided answers to both of these ques-
tions, but his answers are problematic. In response to question
(a), Ruse presents textual evidence which suggests that although
Darwin did occasionally refer to biological machine mechanisms,
unlike earlier biologists he always understood these machine
mechanisms in a purely metaphorical sense. Ruse concludes from
this that Darwin was responsible for demoting the notion of
machine mechanism in biology to a heuristic status. With Darwin,4 Indeed, these authors have adopted this neologism precisely because they recogniz
mechanistic explanations of machine mechanisms. Gerring (2007, p. 163), for instance, re
causal mechanism] departs dramatically from common nineteenth-century and early twent
world. In this context, mechanism [i.e., mechanicism] meant ‘the theory that all phenomena
are explained without recourse to intelligence as an operating cause or principle’ [. . .]. Evide
to a mechanistic causal account modelled on Newtonian physics’.machine mechanisms lost their ontic basis and became reconcep-
tualized as heuristic tools that aid the investigation of adaptation.
Darwin himself made use of the machine mechanism-heuristic in
his inquiry into the workings of barnacles and orchids, and this
remains a common practice in evolutionary biology, where it is
known as ‘reverse engineering’.
Although this account seems reasonable, a more careful exam-
ination reveals its problems. Despite the apparent incompatibility
between the mechanistic conception of organisms as machines
and a Darwinian understanding of organisms, what we actually
ﬁnd when we inspect modern evolutionary biology is that mecha-
nistic language is not used exclusively at a heuristic level. Contrary
to Ruse’s expectations, Darwin did not strip the notion of machine
mechanism of its ontic signiﬁcance. Rather, it was evolutionary
biology itselfwhich adapted to accommodate mechanistic thinking
about organisms, so that since Darwin, ‘the idea that the world is
full of designed machines has been replaced by the idea that it con-
tains evolved machines’ (Craver & Darden, 2005, p. 239, my empha-
sis). In fact, Gould and Lewontin’s (1979) famous critique of
adaptationism can be interpreted precisely as a reaction against
this excessive reliance on mechanistic thinking in evolution, which
all too often constitutes not just a heuristic tool but also a theoret-
ical justiﬁcation for understanding organisms as optimally-
designed machines blindly engineered by natural selection (e.g.,
Dawkins, 1986; Dennett, 1995).
Moving to other areas of contemporary biology, it quickly be-
comes apparent that talk of machine mechanisms remains en-
trenched at an ontological level. In molecular and cellular
biology, for instance, the standard conception of the organism is
that of a machine programmed by its genes and decomposable into
its component machine mechanisms. Subcellular protein com-
plexes are frequently referred to as machines, and the cell itself
is conceived as an assemblage of machine subunits (e.g., Alberts,
1998). An important point, however, is that despite the fact that
machine mechanisms continue to play a fundamental role in many
areas of biology, the term ‘mechanism’ is generally no longer used
to designate them. Instead, biologists today tend to refer to ma-
chine mechanisms simply as ‘machines’, presumably to distinguish
this notion from the sense in which ‘mechanism’ is now most com-
monly used in biology, namely causal mechanism.
Ruse’s explanation for the displacement of machine mechanism
by causal mechanism as the most widely used sense of ‘mecha-
nism’, i.e., his answer to question (b), is also problematic. He sug-
gests that Darwin’s secularization of mechanicism enabled the
concept of ‘mechanism’ to acquire widespread currency in the
broader sense of causal mechanism. With Darwin, ‘mechanism’
came to be used to designate a much wider range of biological phe-
nomena, including Darwin’s own ‘mechanism’ of natural selection.
However, after thoroughly searching through Darwin’s works, Ruse
actually discovers that Darwin ‘simply does not speak of natural
selection as a mechanism’ (Ruse, 2005, p. 291). Darwin only uses
‘mechanism’ in the machine mechanism sense; the very idea of a
causal mechanism is simply alien to him. As Ruse himself indicates,
it is not until the late nineteen-thirties that natural selection came
to be generally referred to as a ‘mechanism’. Neither Fisher (1930)
nor Haldane (1932) used this language, but Dobzhansky (1937)
did, noting that ‘the theory of natural selection is primarily an at-
tempt to give an account of the probable mechanism [i.e., causal
mechanism] of the origin of the adaptations of organisms to theire the importance of distinguishing explanations based on causal mechanisms from
marks: ‘It should be noted that this contemporary understanding of mechanism [i.e.,
ieth-century understandings of the term, which invoked a mechanistic account of the
can be explained in terms of the principles by which machines (mechanical systems)
ntly, to say ‘mechanism’ in a contemporary context does not mean that one is wedded
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tion of mechanicism truly brought about the widespread use of
‘mechanism’ in the causal mechanism sense, why is it that three-
quarters of a century had to pass from the publication of Darwin’s
Origin of species for natural selection to be commonly referred to as
a ‘mechanism’?
In light of these difﬁculties, I want to suggest a rather different
answer to question (b). When considering the factors that had the
greatest impact on mechanicism in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, far more important than the advent of Dar-
winism was the gradual erosion of vitalism. As the philosophical
antithesis of mechanicism, vitalism can be characterized as the
doctrine that upholds the direct inverse of the four core tenets of
mechanicism outlined in Section 2. The heart of the vitalistic doc-
trine is the postulation of a vital principle (which, depending on
the historical period, assumed the form of a soul, a force, or a mode
of organization) that ontologically demarcates living from non-liv-
ing systems. From the seventeenth century onwards, mechanicism
and vitalism developed in parallel, with the mechanists continually
disproving the claims of the vitalists, and the vitalists repeatedly
re-emerging to pose new challenges to the mechanists. However,
by the late nineteenth century the spectacular empirical success
of mechanicism in disciplines as diverse as physiology, develop-
mental biology, and biochemistry ultimately led to the marginali-
zation of vitalism as a workable research program. No longer
being confronted by serious opposition, the mechanistic concep-
tion of life became widely accepted as an elementary presupposi-
tion of biological research in the early decades of the twentieth
century. ‘At the present day’, wrote the embryologist Joseph Need-
ham in 1925, ‘the situation is in effect the complete triumph of
mechanistic biology. It is not alone in the ﬁeld, because the neo-
vitalists do exist as a small minority, but the vast preponderance
of active biological workers are mechanists’ (Needham, 1925, p.
235).
I want to argue that one of the key consequences of the consol-
idation of mechanicism was that it was no longer necessary to
explicitly defend the core tenets of this doctrine. The view that liv-
ing systems are machines did not need to be justiﬁed and could
simply be taken as a given. As a result, mechanism-talk became ap-
plied to all kinds of biological phenomena, given the mechanistic
conﬁdence that everything would, in due course, be explained as
effectively as engineers explain the operation of machines. This
increasingly loose use of ‘mechanism’ caused the word to gradually
lose its distinctive mechanistic connotations, becoming a ‘dead
metaphor’ that could be readily applied beyond the realm of ma-
chine-like systems to any biological phenomenon in need of a cau-
sal explanation. It is this semantic shift, I suggest, which led the
term ‘mechanism’, understood in the more general and inclusive
sense of causal mechanism, to acquire such widespread currency
in biology.
Evidence for this account can be found by inspecting the writ-
ings of the biologists of this period. For example, J. S. Haldane,
one of the most inﬂuential physiologists of the early twentieth cen-
tury, drew attention on several occasions to the increasing prolifer-
ation of mechanism-talk in biology, pointing out that using the
term ‘mechanism’ with respect to a phenomenon no longer im-
plied conceiving it mechanistically as a machine mechanism. In
The sciences and philosophy, he observed that ‘In current physiolog-
ical literature it is still customary, in describing what is known as
to different bodily activities, to refer to them as ‘mechanisms’—
for instance, the ‘mechanisms’ of reproduction, respiration, secre-
tion, etc.’ despite the fact that ‘There are perhaps few physiologists5 It is interesting to note that the causal mechanism sense of ‘mechanism’ ﬁrst began to
against this looser use of the term (see Ruse, 2005).who now consider that they have any real conception of these
mechanisms [as machine mechanisms]’. The usage of ‘mechanism’,
Haldane noted, has become ‘a mere matter of custom’ (Haldane,
1929, p. 59). In The philosophical basis of biology, Haldane reiterated
these remarks, indicating that physiologists ‘have acquired the ha-
bit, almost unconscious, of referring to the ‘mechanisms’ of various
physiological activities, though they have not the remotest concep-
tion of what sort of mechanisms [i.e., machine mechanisms] these
activities represent’. He concluded from this that ‘the use of the
word ‘mechanism’ is a mere empty formality’ (Haldane, 1931, p.
11). Although Haldane openly voiced his concern regarding this
looser use of ‘mechanism’ in the causal mechanism sense, warning
that ‘such a mode of expression is extremely misleading to that
miscellaneous body which we call the public’ (Haldane, 1929, p.
59), he clearly did not succeed in persuading his contemporaries
against this usage of the term. Still, what is relevant in the present
discussion is that his remarks lend credence to my proposed expla-
nation of the supplantation of machine mechanism by causal
mechanism as the most common meaning of the term in biology.5
4. The mechanismic program in relation to mechanicism
So far I have argued that due to the success of mechanicism in
the early twentieth century, the causal mechanism sense of ‘mech-
anism’ became predominant in biology during this period, and re-
mains so to this day. But how and when did the different senses of
‘mechanism’ come to be featured in the philosophy of biology?
Exploring this question will help situate the recent mechanismic
program in relation to mechanicism. This will be a key step in
the development of my argument, as showing the fundamental dif-
ferences between these two research programs will provide the ba-
sis for my critical engagement with the mechanismic program in
Sections 5 and 6.
The longstanding conﬂict between mechanists on the one side
and vitalists and organicists on the other, being in the ﬁnal analysis
a dispute concerning the very nature of life itself, constituted the
central theme in the philosophy of biology during the ﬁrst half of
the twentieth century (see Bertalanffy, 1952; Johnstone, 1914;
Woodger, 1929), even if by this time most experimental biologists
(like Needham) considered that the dispute had already been re-
solved in favour of mechanicism. Mechanistic biology and machine
mechanisms continued to be discussed in subsequent decades
(e.g., Varela & Maturana, 1972), capturing even the attention of
leading exponents of logical empiricism like Hempel (1966, ch. 8)
and Nagel (1979, ch. 12). However, following the academic institu-
tionalization of the philosophy of biology at the hands of David
Hull, Michael Ruse and others, discussions of mechanistic biology
came to an abrupt end as the new generation of philosophers of
biology, inﬂuenced by philosophically-minded evolutionists like
Ernst Mayr, turned its attention to theoretical issues in evolution-
ary biology, such as the levels of selection, the deﬁnition of ﬁtness,
and the nature of species. Nevertheless, critical examinations of
mechanistic biology and machine mechanisms are still featured
in the contemporary literature (e.g., Dupré, 2007; Lewens, 2004;
Lewontin, 2000; McLaughlin, 2001; Rosen, 1991), although the
terms in which the issues are discussed have changed somewhat.
What of the third sense of ‘mechanism’? When did causal
mechanisms enter into philosophical discussions of biology?
Browsing the literature one ﬁnds references to the term ‘mecha-
nism’ employed in the causal mechanism sense in articles by
Kauffman (1970), Grene (1971) and Wimsatt (1972, 1974). How-
ever, Brandon (1985) appears to have been the ﬁrst to provide apermeate the literature on natural selection only a few years after Haldane’s warnings
D.J. Nicholson / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2012) 152–163 157detailed analysis of the importance of causal mechanisms in bio-
logical research. Brandon’s account is important for several rea-
sons. For one thing, it is the ﬁrst to explicitly recognize the
semantic ambivalence inherent in the biological usage of ‘mecha-
nism’, as well as the inevitable difﬁculties that arise when attempt-
ing to pin down this concept.6 More crucially, it presents an
understanding of the postulation of causal mechanisms in science
that distinctly characterizes the mechanismic program today,
namely that the appeal to causal mechanisms in scientiﬁc practice
does not imply a commitment to the reductionistic agenda of
mechanicism.7 Indeed, whereas mechanicism, as Craver and Darden
(2005, p. 235) note, is ‘closely aligned with the spirit of reductionism
and the unity of science’, the mechanismic program focuses on mul-
ti-level explanations given in terms of causal mechanisms and with
an explicitly non-reductive view of science (see Craver, 2005; Dar-
den, 2005).
The mechanismic program, unlike mechanicism, is not primar-
ily concerned with biological ontology, but with the nature of bio-
logical explanations. This is not surprising given that the
postulation of causal mechanisms, having become a virtually ubiq-
uitous practice in contemporary biology, discloses rather little
about a biologist’s ontological commitments. Physiologists, ecolo-
gists, neuroscientists, and cell biologists have different under-
standings of life, yet they all appeal to causal mechanisms in
their explanations. Clearly, whatever ontological commitments
they all share are likely to be very general in nature. This stands
in contrast with molecular biologists’ standard mechanistic con-
ception of living systems as machine mechanisms, for which expla-
nations are sought from the bottom up in increasing levels of
complexity. In every respect, the appeal to machine mechanisms
is indicative of far more substantive ontological commitments than
the appeal to causal mechanisms. These ontological commitments
(summarized in Section 2) are at the heart of the mechanistic con-
ception of life that dominated biological thought for much of the
twentieth century, but which today, with the growing emphasis
on systemic thinking in biology, is increasingly viewed as simply
one of several possible understandings of what living systems are
and how they should be studied.
In the few occasions when mechanismic philosophers explic-
itly address matters of biological ontology, it is usually to distin-
guish the mechanists’ appeal to machine mechanisms from their
own concern with causal mechanisms (recall Fig. 1). By demarcat-
ing causal mechanisms from machine mechanisms, mechanismic
philosophers distance their research program from the ontologi-
cal commitments of mechanicism. Mechanismic philosophers dis-
tinguish causal mechanisms from machine mechanisms in two
ways. The ﬁrst strategy (which I already alluded to in the Intro-
duction) is to focus on the way the term ‘mechanism’ is presently
used in biology and disregard older uses of the term as irrelevant
to current analyses of the concept (e.g., Craver, 2007, p. 3). What
this does is minimize the scope for conﬂating the older biological
usage of ‘mechanism’ in the machine mechanism sense (predom-
inant in biology until the ﬁrst third of the twentieth century) with
the current biological usage of the term in the causal mechanism
sense. The second strategy is to explicitly differentiate ‘mecha-
nisms’ (i.e., causal mechanisms) from ‘machines’ (i.e., machine
mechanisms), and both Darden (2006, pp. 280–281; 2007. p.
142) and Craver (2007, p. 4 and p. 140) do this on more than
one occasion.6 Indeed, when Brandon asks what mechanisms are, he is unable to provide a precise deﬁ
machine mechanisms) but also to ‘small peripheral populations and geographic isolating
philosophy of biology ‘mechanism’ ‘is typically used to designate the position opposing vita
by Brandon’s proposal to use the term ‘mechanism’ in a fourth sense to refer to the practic
call mechanism is given in terms of search of mechanisms’ (Brandon, 1985, p. 346).
7 Brandon further develops this important thesis in a more recent essay entitled ‘ReducIt is important to realize the extent to which MDC’s (2000) ac-
count of causal mechanisms has marked a turning point in philo-
sophical discussions of this concept. Before MDC’s account,
characterizations of ‘mechanisms’ routinely conﬂated the machine
mechanism and causal mechanism senses. For instance, Thagard
(1998) noticed that the term ‘mechanism’ is commonly featured
in contemporary explanations of disease, but deﬁned it in the ma-
chine mechanism sense as ‘a system of parts that operate or inter-
act like those of a machine’ (p. 66, my emphasis). Similarly, when
Glennan ﬁrst deﬁned ‘mechanism’, he indicated that his deﬁnition
is meant to apply to ‘complex systems analogous to machines’
(Glennan, 1996, p. 51, my emphasis). In fact, Glennan has contin-
ued to heavily rely on the notion of machine mechanism in his ac-
count of ‘mechanisms’, going as far as to cite cells and organisms as
prime examples of his conception of them (Glennan, 2002, p.
S345). Although mechanistic biologists do indeed ontologically
conceive cells and organisms as machine mechanisms, it makes lit-
tle sense for any biologist to consider the causal mechanism of an
entire cell or organism. Most mechanismic philosophers would dis-
agree with Glennan’s designation of cells and organisms as ‘mech-
anisms’, and the reason is clear. The new mechanismic program
‘strives to characterize mechanism [. . .] in a manner faithful to
biologists’ own usages’ (Darden, 2007, p.142) and causal mecha-
nism is what most present-day biologists mean when they use
the word ‘mechanism’. This is why mechanismic philosophers fo-
cus exclusively on this sense of the term, and why most of them
would not recognize supposed machine mechanisms like cells
and organisms as ‘mechanisms’.
The reason for Glennan’s apparent unconcern regarding the lack
of correlation between his mechanistically tinged understanding of
the concept of ‘mechanism’ and the way the term is actually used
bymost contemporary biologists is that his account of mechanisms
is not primarily motivated by an interest in scientiﬁc practice (like
MDC and others), but by a concern with the nature of causation. In-
deed, in his 1996 paper Glennan sets out to address Hume’s scep-
tical challenge regarding the connection between cause and effect
by suggesting that ‘mechanisms’ could provide a plausible meta-
physics of causation. Glennan proposes that events are causally re-
lated if there is a ‘mechanism’ that connects them, and he uses this
conception of ‘mechanism’ to develop a mechanical view of expla-
nation (Glennan, 2002). In doing so, Glennan builds on Salmon’s
(1984) account of causal-mechanical explanation, which was itself
an elaboration of Railton’s (1978) deductive-nomological model of
probabilistic explanation, in which the term ‘mechanism’ was
introduced into the philosophical literature on scientiﬁc explana-
tion (Glennan 2002, p. S343). Interestingly, this earlier work on
‘mechanisms’, unlike the more recent biologically-inspired
mechanismic discourse, does actually show some clear links with
mechanicism. Railton (1978) says the following regarding his
mechanistic orientation:
The goal of understanding the world is a theoretical goal, and if
the world is a machine [. . .] then our theory ought to give us
some insight into the structure and workings of the mechanism
[i.e., machine mechanism], above and beyond the capability of
predicting and controlling its outcomes. (Railton, 1978, p. 208,
my emphasis)
This conception of the world as a machine mechanism, as well as
the stated desire to understand, predict, and control it, are allnition. He notes that ‘mechanism’ may refer to ‘spring-wound clocks and watches’ (i.e.,
barriers’ (i.e., causal mechanisms). To make matters worse, Brandon observes, in the
lism, holism, or organicism’ (i.e.,mechanicism). The semantic ambiguity is exacerbated
e of formulating causal mechanisms in science, stating confusingly that ‘the position I
tionism versus holism versus mechanism’ (Brandon, 1996, ch. 11).
158 D.J. Nicholson / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2012) 152–163characteristic attributes of mechanistic philosophy. Along similar
lines, Glennan points out that his account of ‘mechanisms’ is ‘largely
inspired by the insights of the Mechanical philosophers’ of the sev-
enteenth century’ (Glennan, 1996, p. 51). Thus, Skipper and Mill-
stein’s (2005) banner of ‘the new mechanistic philosophy’ would
have been far more appropriate if it had been used to refer to this
literature on ‘mechanisms’, rather than to the more recent examin-
ations of causal mechanisms in biology, which on the whole bear
little connection to the original motivations of this earlier work in
the philosophy of science. Darden’s latest appraisal of the mechan-
ismic program makes this explicit when she clariﬁes that ‘work on
mechanisms in biology originated (primarily) not as a response to
past work in philosophy of science but from consideration of the
work of biologists themselves’ (Darden, 2008, p. 958).
Overall, it is clear that the mechanismic program must be re-
garded as being completely independent from mechanicism, both
as a general doctrine and speciﬁcally as it applies to biology. In-
deed, we have seen how leading proponents of the mechanismic
program like Craver and Darden reject some of the core tenets of
mechanicism, such as the reducibility of biology to physics and
chemistry, and the exclusive reliance on reductionistic explana-
tions. Demarcating the mechanismic program from mechanicism
is crucial, as the failure to do so results in problematic analyses
of causal mechanisms. The most glaring example of this, in my
view, is found in some of Bechtel’s recent work. While most
mechanismic philosophers are rather cautious in their use of his-
tory when discussing causal mechanisms, drawing on relatively re-
cent case studies when illustrating their claims, Bechtel traces the
appeal to ‘mechanisms’ in scientiﬁc explanation not just to Des-
cartes in the seventeenth century, but all the way back to the An-
cient Greek atomists of the ﬁfth century BCE (Bechtel, 2006, pp.
20–21; 2008, p. 10). But instead of considering how the meaning
of ‘mechanism’ has developed over time (as Ruse (2005) does,
and as I have attempted to do in Section 3), Bechtel just takes
the modern sense of ‘mechanism’ as causal mechanism as his start-
ing point and then simply projects it back in history. As a result, his
historical discussions conﬂate the distinctive appeal to machine
mechanisms by mechanistic biologists with the almost ubiquitous
appeal to causal mechanisms by biologists today (e.g., Bechtel,
2006; 2007, ch. 2). Understanding the term ‘mechanism’ exclu-
sively in the causal mechanism sense, Bechtel complains that crit-
ics of mechanistic biology commit a grave mistake in assimilating
the notion of ‘mechanism’ to that of machine (Bechtel, 2008, p. 2),
not realizing that the very reason for this is that when mechanists
do speak of ‘mechanisms’, machine-like systems (i.e., machine
mechanisms) is precisely what they have in mind.8
The striking thing is that Bechtel, just like Craver and Darden,
actually rejects central tenets of mechanistic biology, such as the
exclusive reliance on explanatory reductionism (Bechtel & Abra-
hamsen, 2008), and the privileging of the efﬁcient and material
causes of organisms over and above their systemic, self-organizing
properties (Bechtel, 2007). But, again, instead of distancing himself
from mechanicism, Bechtel seems to think that the only way to
make sense of the pervasiveness of mechanism-talk in current
biology is to broaden the doctrine of mechanistic biology accord-
ingly, not realizing that the appeal to the term ‘mechanism’ in sci-8 This is as true for seventeenth-century mechanists like Descartes as it is for twentieth
9 Much more could be said regarding Bechtel’s problematic reconstruction of mechanisti
organization for the mechanists (Bechtel, 2007) despite the fact that the concept of self-org
fundamentally different frommachines and thus cannot be explained in mechanistic terms,
constitute the principal manifestation of the vital principle they postulated. However, ela
10 The fact that Bechtel & Richardson (1993) are interested in mechanistic explanatio
(pertaining to causal mechanisms) is evidenced by their assertion that ‘By calling the e
producing a certain behavior in a manner analogous to that of machines developed through hu
begins with a characterization of machines, not of mechanisms. However, in his more rec
machine mechanisms by mechanists, but also the widespread appeal to causal mechanismentiﬁc practice today no longer commits one to mechanicism (as
‘mechanism’ is now generally employed in the causal mechanism
sense). This leads Bechtel to formulate a very odd conception of
mechanistic biology, so general in content and inclusive in its
applicability that none of the distinctive ontological and epistemo-
logical commitments that tend to be associated with it (see Sec-
tion 2) are relevant. Instead, all that qualiﬁes a biologist as a
‘mechanist’ for Bechtel is that she appeals to ‘mechanisms’ in her
research. Similarly, all that qualiﬁes an explanation as ‘mechanis-
tic’ is that a ‘mechanism’ is featured in it, regardless of the way
in which this concept is used.9
I can think of two reasons for Bechtel’s misrepresentation of
mechanicism. The ﬁrst is that some of his earlier work (e.g., Bech-
tel & Richardson, 1993) was in fact concerned with mechanistic
explanations in biology, speciﬁcally with the strategies of decom-
position and localization that are often featured in them.10 So in
the wake of the inﬂuence of MDC’s (2000) account of causal mech-
anisms, Bechtel might have felt it natural to bridge his earlier dis-
cussion of machine mechanisms with an examination of causal
mechanisms, since, after all, the term ‘mechanism’ is central to
both discourses. Still, the main reason for Bechtel’s misrepresenta-
tion is that he does not appear to recognize that the concept of
‘mechanism’ has more than one meaning. It is because he conﬂates
the notions of machine mechanism and causal mechanism that he
also conﬂates mechanicism with the mechanismic program (e.g.,
Bechtel, 2006, ch. 2; 2008, ch. 1).
Nevertheless, the mischaracterization of mechanicism is not
the only, or even the main, problem that results from the conﬂa-
tion of causal mechanisms and machine mechanisms. The most
serious consequence of not distinguishing these notions is that
causal mechanisms become inappropriately endowed with the on-
tic status of machine mechanisms. This ontologization of causal
mechanisms is very widespread in the philosophical literature,
and in the next section I will discuss some of the problems that
stem from it.
5. Problems resulting from the ontologization of causal
mechanisms
Mechanismic philosophers tend to conceive causal mechanisms
as real things in the world existing independently from our con-
ceptualization of them. However, based on the role they play in sci-
entiﬁc practice, I suggest that causal mechanisms are better
understood as heuristic models that facilitate the explanation of
phenomena. The fact that the overwhelming majority of mechanis-
mic philosophers speak of them as ‘real systems in nature’ (Bech-
tel, 2006, p. 33) I attribute to an inadvertent transposition of the
ontic status of machine mechanisms (the original sense in which
‘mechanism’ was used) onto the notion of causal mechanism (the
standard meaning of ‘mechanism’ in biology today). This ontologi-
zation of causal mechanisms tends to result in a conception of
them as autonomous complex systems (analogous to machine
mechanisms), which constitute and operate within the organism
(e.g., Bechtel, 2007; Glennan, 2002). I maintain that this ontic
conception of causal mechanisms is problematic, and I will
substantiate this claim by examining what are perhaps the two-century mechanists like Loeb.
c biology, such as the way in which he misappropriates classic vitalistic ideas like self-
anization was actually coined by Immanuel Kant in order to argue that organisms are
and that most vitalists after Kant took the distinctive self-organization of organisms to
borating these claims would take me beyond the scope of this paper.
ns (pertaining to machine mechanisms) as opposed to mechanismic explanations
xplanations mechanistic, we are highlighting the fact that they treat the systems as
man technology’ (p. 17, my emphasis). Indeed, their analysis ofmechanistic explanation
ent work Bechtel readily describes as ‘mechanistic’ not just the distinctive appeal to
s in current scientiﬁc practice.
D.J. Nicholson / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2012) 152–163 159most distinctive features of causal mechanisms in biology: function
and organization (cf. McKay & Williamson, 2010).
5.1. Function
The operation of a causal process described in a causal mecha-
nism produces a particular phenomenon that serves to individuate
and causally relate the entities and activities that are responsible
for it. In biology, the phenomenon produced by the causal process
described in a causal mechanism usually enables the fulﬁlment of a
function, so that specifying the causal mechanism for a function
explains how this function is causally brought about. The problem
of conceiving causal mechanisms as autonomous complex systems
is that it overlooks the conditions that actually enable the func-
tions of these systems to be carried out, as well as the true biolog-
ical signiﬁcance of those functions.
A living organism is an organized network of processes of pro-
duction, transformation, and regeneration of components that con-
tinuously realizes itself by means of the coordinated orchestration
of the components that make it up (Maturana & Varela, 1980). In
this way, the organism constitutes an integrated whole which
maintains its identity through time by regulating, repairing, and
reproducing its component parts. These parts stand in a relation
of collective interdependence, as every one of them is necessary
for the generation and operation of every other. Thus the attribu-
tion of functions to the parts of an organism is dictated by the
means in which each part individually contributes to the mainte-
nance and organization of all other parts and hence to the organ-
ism as a whole (see Edin, 2008; McLaughlin, 2001; Mossio,
Saborido, & Moreno, 2009). This means that the function of all sub-
organismic systems and processes featured in causal mechanisms
is ultimately that of preserving the autopoietic organization of
the whole organism.
The idea of autonomous causal mechanisms operating within
the organism is, I suggest, nothing more than a pragmatic idealiza-
tion that biologists appeal to in order to narrow their focus on the
particular parts of the organism they happen to be investigating.
This heuristic fragmentation of the organism into causal mecha-
nisms, despite being necessary for its investigation, often comes
at the expense of neglecting the way in which the organism as a
whole inﬂuences the behaviour of its parts. In current philosophi-
cal accounts, the ontic conception of causal mechanisms as real
autonomous subsystems neglects the fact that in order to make
appropriate biological sense of the subsystems’ functions, these
subsystems need to be framed within a set of background condi-
tions, that is, the organismic context that enables them to carry
out their functions in the ﬁrst place.11
Craver (2007, p. 122) has indicated that ‘The core normative
requirement on mechanistic [i.e.,mechanismic] explanations is that
they must fully account for the explanandum phenomena’. That is,
‘Good explanations account for all of the features of a phenomenon
rather than a subset’ (ibid., p. 161). This means that mechanismic
explanations that do not include a full account of the organismic
context that enables the production of the explanandum phenome-
non (or function) are, on Craver’s terms, necessarily incomplete.
This is problematic as actual scientiﬁc practice demonstrates that
mechanismic explanations are never exhaustive catalogues of all
the causal relations necessary for the production of phenomena,11 The problematic transference of mechanistic thinking is particularly noticeable here. W
with clearly-delineated output functions without the loss of information, the parts in an or
collective interdependence and are thus not autonomous in any important respect (even if
any explanation of the functions of parts in an organism needs to account not just for the pa
12 Not only does Craver not refer to the inﬂuence of the whole organism in explaining ho
organization, but there is reason to believe that mechanismic explanations, by virtue
mechanismic explanations are, in Craver’s words, ‘anchored in components’ (Craver, 2007, p
is not explainable by attending exclusively to the properties of component parts.such as the enabling conditions provided by the organism as a
whole. Rather, mechanismic explanations specify only those fea-
tures of the underlying causal networks that biologists deem most
relevant for manipulating and controlling the phenomena whilst at
the same time presupposing a great deal of the organismic context
that makes them possible. For this reason, it makes more sense to
view causal mechanisms as idealized spatiotemporal cross-sec-
tions of organisms that heuristically pick out certain causal fea-
tures over others in order to account for how given functions
within the organism are carried out, as these are generally the
things that biologists describe when they use the term ‘mecha-
nism’ in their explanations.
5.2. Organization
Mechanismic philosophers frequently emphasize the impor-
tance of organization for understanding how causal mechanisms
account for functions or behaviours. MDC (2000, p. 3), for instance,
state that ‘The organization of entities and activities determines
the ways in which they produce the phenomenon’. Bechtel
(2006, p. 26) similarly notes that ‘The orchestrated functioning of
the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena’. The
problem is that mechanismic philosophers do not actually explain
how the entities and activities in a mechanism are organized, only
that they are organized. MDC (2000, p. 3) point out that ‘Entities of-
ten must be appropriately located, structured, and oriented, and
the activities in which they engage must have a temporal order,
rate, and duration’ but say nothing about the means by which
these crucial organizational requirements are actually met in living
organisms. Instead, all that discussions of organization in the
mechanismic literature amount to is the plain assertion that orga-
nization matters (e.g., Craver, 2007, pp. 134–139).
Still, if causal mechanisms are to be conceived ontically as real
suborganismic systems (rather than epistemically as idealized
models of those subsystems, as I suggest) then just paying lip ser-
vice to the fact that these subsystems are organized is insufﬁcient.
To fully account for the explanandum phenomenon (Craver’s nor-
mative requirement for a good mechanismic explanation) it be-
comes necessary not just to specify, but also to explain how this
organization is generated and maintained. The problem is that this
requires taking the description beyond the actual causal mecha-
nism to the level of the organism as a whole, given that suborgan-
ismic parts do not organize themselves but rely on the action of the
whole organism for their generation, organization, and mainte-
nance. This is rarely understood in mechanismic accounts of orga-
nization. For example, when Craver (2007, p. 148) indicates that a
‘mechanism might compensate for the loss of a part by recovering
(healing the part), by making new use of other parts, or by reorga-
nizing the remaining parts’, he is inappropriately attributing ac-
tions to an ontologized causal mechanism that are actually
performed by the organism which contains it.12
As I have argued in my discussion of function, one of the advan-
tages of understanding causal mechanisms as idealized models of
suborganismic causal processes rather than as real things is that
a satisfactory mechanismic explanation need not include an ac-
count of how the target system is actually organized by the organ-
ism even if this organization is strictly speaking necessary for the
system to causally bring about the phenomenon. This is more inhereas a machine mechanism can be broken down into discrete, self-contained parts
ganism (ontologized in current accounts of causal mechanisms) stand in a relation of
they can be construed as such for the purposes of their investigation). Consequently,
rts themselves but also for the organismic context that makes their function possible.
w the causal processes instantiated by causal mechanisms achieve and maintain their
of their nature, simply cannot accommodate organismic organization, given that
. 138), and an organism’s autopoietic organization is a system-level phenomenon that
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nisms tend to pragmatically abstract away the organismic context
and only specify the causal features that are taken to be most rel-
evant for controlling and manipulating the phenomena being
investigated. In the next section, I will elaborate and defend the
epistemic account of causal mechanisms, indicating the further
advantages of this view over the ontic conception that most
mechanismic philosophers presently favour.
6. Defending an epistemic conception of causal mechanisms
It is important to keep in mind that the causal mechanism sense
of ‘mechanism’ was not formulated in abstracto and then applied to
scientiﬁc practice. Rather, it arose from scientiﬁc practice and it
has only recently been philosophically reconstructed to make
sense of how scientists explain phenomena. Consequently, the suc-
cess of any given philosophical reconstruction of ‘mechanism’
must be measured in terms of how well it captures the way this
term is used in scientiﬁc practice. The conception of causal mech-
anism that I argue best ﬁts biologists’ mechanism-talk is that of a
contingent explanatory description which heuristically abstracts
away the complexity of a living system sufﬁciently to describe
some localized causal process within it which leads to the realiza-
tion of some function of interest. That is, causal mechanisms are
epistemic models that enable the explanation of how phenomena
are causally brought about.
Interestingly, although most mechanismic philosophers claim
to uphold an ontic view of causal mechanisms, much of what they
say is actually perfectly compatible with an epistemic conception.
In fact, it is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd instances in the philosophical liter-
ature in which ontically construed causal mechanisms are con-
ﬂated with their epistemic representations, as I will show in a
moment. This ambiguity, I suggest, is the result of the tension that
inevitably arises from inappropriately transposing the ontic status
of machine mechanisms onto causal mechanisms on the one hand,
and paying close attention to the role that mechanism-talk actually
plays in scientiﬁc practice on the other.
When scientists inquire about the causal mechanism of P
(where P is the phenomenon of interest), the term ‘mechanism’
does not refer to that which is explained but rather to that which
does the explaining. Craver (2007) acknowledges this when he as-
serts that ‘The explanans is a mechanism’ (p. 139) and the phenom-
enon of interest is the explanandum (p. 6).13 In this way, specifying a
causal mechanism for a phenomenon implies providing an explana-
tion for it. As MDC indicate, ‘Mechanisms are sought to explain how a
phenomenon comes about or how some signiﬁcant process works’
(2000, p. 2, my emphasis). One of the advantages of the epistemic
view of causal mechanisms is that it is no longer necessary to postu-
late additional epistemic notions like ‘mechanism sketch’ and ‘mech-
anism schema’ to make sense of mechanismic explanations.
Depending on the degree of abstraction, causal mechanisms may
constitute what mechanismic philosophers call ‘sketches’, ‘schemas’,
or ‘mechanisms’. Craver (2007, p. 114) tacitly admits the continuity
between these notions when he indicates that progress in formulat-
ing a successful mechanismic explanation ‘involves movement [. . .]
along the sketch-schema-mechanism axis’.
Moreover, the very characterizations of causal mechanisms that
mechanismic philosophers have proposed are in fact perfectly
compatible with an epistemic understanding of them. According
to the epistemic view, causal mechanisms constitute idealized rep-
resentations of causal processes. These causal processes are ab-
stracted temporally and spatially. Temporally, the causal13 Thus, mechanismic explanations should be understood not as explanations of causal m
14 Indeed, on several occasions Craver (2007, p. 141) acknowledges that causal mechani
distributed’ or ‘tightly interwoven into their systematic context’ (ibid., p. 143, fn. 23).mechanism delimits a particular causal process by specifying arbi-
trary beginning and end points that are selected on pragmatic
grounds. MDC (2000, p. 11) explicitly recognize that the set-up
and termination conditions of causal mechanisms are ‘idealized
states’, and Darden has reiterated this point on several occasions,
noting that the beginning and end points of causal mechanisms
are ‘more or less arbitrarily chosen’ (Darden, 2007, p. 141; see also
Torres, 2009, p. 240, fn. 10). So although MDC purport to uphold an
ontic conception of causal mechanisms, they actually characterize
them in terms of epistemically selected beginning and end points.
Causal mechanisms are also abstracted spatially, according to
the epistemic view, as they can only capture certain ontic features
of reality at the expense of neglecting others. What gets repre-
sented and what is omitted in a causal mechanism is dictated by
the nature of the explanandum phenomenon. Craver (2007, pp.
139–160) reaches this same conclusion when he considers the nor-
mative requirements that determine whether or not something is
included as part of a causal mechanism, asserting repeatedly that
the delimitation of causal mechanisms can only occur in the context
of explanation. That is, entities, activities, and organizational fea-
tures are part of the causal mechanism for P (where P is the phe-
nomenon of interest) if and only if they are relevant to the
explanation of P. The act of individuating the causal mechanism
for P is thus the act of determining what aspects are causally rele-
vant to the explanation of P. The delimitation of causal mecha-
nisms hence ‘depend[s] on the epistemologically prior delineation
of relevance boundaries’ (Craver, 2007, p. 144, my emphasis).
This view of causal mechanisms signiﬁcantly departs from the
ontic conception of them as autonomous systems akin to machine
mechanisms (defended by Glennan, Bechtel, and at times by Craver
himself, as shown in Section 5), given that the parts of a causal
mechanism do not even need to be structurally demarcated.14 All
that matters is that they are causally relevant to the production of
the explanandum phenomenon. Craver ﬂeshes out this notion of cau-
sal relevance by appealing to Woodward’s (2003) manipulability
theory of causation. In this way, a part is causally relevant to the
phenomenon produced by a causal mechanism if one can modify
the production of this phenomenon by manipulating the behaviour
of the part, and one can modify the behaviour of the part by manip-
ulating the production of the phenomenon by the causal mechanism.
Although Craver’s account of explanatory relevance is compati-
ble with both an ontic and an epistemic conception of causal mech-
anisms, there do not appear to be any obvious reasons for
favouring the former over the latter view; if anything, the latter
view seems more plausible. Explanations always presuppose a
context that speciﬁes what is to be explained and how much detail
will sufﬁce for a satisfying answer, and Craver recognizes that it is
this very epistemic context that determines how causal mecha-
nisms are individuated and what details are featured in them.
The crucial requirement of any causal mechanism, according to
Craver, is that it must capture the underlying causal relationships
of the target system in such a way that it exhibits the necessary re-
sources for explaining how the target system will behave as a re-
sult of interventions and manipulations of its parts. An epistemic
view of causal mechanisms fulﬁls this requirement.
It may be helpful to illustrate these claims with an example.
Consider the causal mechanism for the membrane trafﬁcking of
the delta-opoioid receptor (DOR) induced by pain stimulation,
shown in Fig. 2 (adapted from Bie & Pan, 2007). This causal
mechanism exhibits all of the features I have discussed. It is a
step-by-step explanation of the mode of operation of the signal
transduction pathway induced by pain stimulation that triggersechanisms, but as explanations given in terms of causal mechanisms.
sms ‘frequently transgress compartmental boundaries’, and ‘are often spatially quite
Fig. 2. Causal mechanism for the membrane trafﬁcking of the Delta-Opioid Receptor (DOR). Upon agonist binding (1), DOR is phosphorylated by GRK (2). It then binds to
proteins AP-2 and arrestin (3), and undergoes a process of internalization via endocytosis (4). Once internalized, the receptor is sorted and targeted either to endosomes via
the recycling pathway (5) for membrane insertion, or to lysosomes for degradation via the degradation pathway (6). DOR is synthesized in the endoplasmic reticulum (7), and
transported to the trans-Golgi network (8), becoming a mature receptor which is targeted in dense-core vesicles (9), ready for membrane trafﬁcking and insertion. Chronic
pain stimulation activates receptors (10) and increases intracellular calcium concentration, inducing the membrane trafﬁcking of DOR.
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relief. The causal mechanism is abstracted both temporally and
spatially. Temporally, it abstracts the continuous life-cycle of
DOR into a series of discrete idealized stages, which are numbered
in the causal mechanism. Spatially, although the whole cell is de-
picted, only the features that are causally relevant to the mem-
brane trafﬁcking of DOR (i.e., the explanandum phenomenon) are
featured in the causal mechanism. What is represented in the cau-
sal mechanism is contingent on epistemic considerations given
that if we happened to be interested in explaining any other cellu-
lar phenomenon, a different yet partially-overlapping set of fea-
tures would be included in the causal mechanism. Moreover, the
organismic context (in this case, the cell) is almost completely ab-
stracted away and yet it is heavily presupposed, as it provides the
enabling conditions that are ultimately necessary for the mem-
brane trafﬁcking of DOR. Finally, the causal mechanism constitutes
an explanatory model of a particular cross-section of the cell that
provides the necessary resources for anticipating how interven-
tions and manipulations of any of the causally relevant parts with-
in the cell and any of the successive stages of the described process
will affect the membrane trafﬁcking of DOR. In this way, this causal
mechanism serves the heuristic purpose of aiding the physiological
and pharmacological investigation of pain relief.
So far in this section, I have advanced my defence of an epi-
stemic view of causal mechanisms by showing how the key fea-
tures of causal mechanisms that mechanismic philosophers deem
most important for understanding them are not only not incom-
patible with the epistemic account I propose, but actually provide
strong support for it. Nevertheless, the compatibility of the cen-
tral claims of MDC and others with an epistemic conception of
causal mechanisms does not constitute the main incentive for
adopting it. The major reason for defending an epistemic account,
as I will argue in the remainder of this section, is that it captures
the meaning of biologists’ mechanism-talk in ways that are sim-
ply beyond the reach of any single ontic conception of causal
mechanisms.Causal mechanisms are invoked to explain an extremely wide
range of phenomena. As Allen (2005, p. 264) indicates, causal
mechanism ‘can refer to very speciﬁc processes, such as the nucle-
ophilic attack by the reactive group of an enzyme on an exposed
covalent bond of its substrate, or to a whole category of reactions
such as cell signal responses due to protein kinase A (PKA) second
messengers’. As the postulation of causal mechanisms has become
a virtually ubiquitous practice in biological research, it is practi-
cally impossible to deﬁne what a causal mechanism is in a way
that meaningfully captures all the different uses of this notion, gi-
ven that the conditions of satisfaction for what counts as a causal
mechanism are entirely determined by the context in which it is
postulated and on the kind of questions that are asked of the
explanandum phenomenon. If, as I suggest, the notion of causal
mechanism is understood epistemically, then it can be character-
ized as an explanation where the explanans and explanandum are
sorted out from the context of its formulation. However, if causal
mechanisms keep being conceived as ‘real systems in nature’
(Bechtel, 2006, p. 33), it becomes exceedingly difﬁcult to specify
exactly what these ‘systems’ actually are, not to mention what they
all have in common.
Paradoxically, this problem stems from the mechanismic pro-
gram’s desire to closely adhere to scientiﬁc practice, given that as
long as it remains ‘faithful to biologists’ own usages’ of ‘mecha-
nism’ (Darden, 2007, p. 142), it cannot fulﬁl its objective of onti-
cally characterizing this notion in a concrete and uniﬁed manner.
The reason for this is that there is an unavoidable trade-off be-
tween the degree of concreteness of any given ontic characteriza-
tion of causal mechanisms and the breadth of its applicability. In
other words, an ontic characterization of causal mechanisms can
only increase its domain of applicability at the expense of sacriﬁc-
ing the concreteness of its formulation. Consequently, the only way
mechanismic philosophers could encompass all the different ways
in which the notion of causal mechanism is employed in scientiﬁc
practice would be to propose an ontic characterization so general
and so abstract that it would be effectively vacuous.
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nism of natural selection provides an instructive illustration of this
dilemma. Skipper and Millstein (2005) have convincingly argued
that none of the major ontic conceptions of causal mechanism suc-
cessfully captures ‘the mechanism of natural selection’. The causal
mechanism of natural selection is not composed of entities and
activities organized to produce regular changes (á la MDC), nor is
it a series of parts in a complex system interacting to produce a
behaviour (á la Glennan), nor is it a structure performing a function
in virtue of its component parts (á la Bechtel). The different ways in
which mechanismic philosophers have dealt with this incompati-
bility is quite revealing. Glennan (2005b) bites the bullet and con-
cludes that ‘there is no such thing as the mechanism of natural
selection’. This strategy is problematic because it is at odds with
the mechanismic commitment to the ‘details of scientiﬁc practice’
(MDC, 2000, p. 2), given that evolutionary biologists do routinely
refer to natural selection as a ‘mechanism’. Craver and Darden
(2005, p. 240) instead contemplate ‘whether the account of mech-
anism should be broadened to allow for stochastic processes and
other forms of organization’. Skipper and Millstein (2005, p. 344)
also consider this option but decide against it because postulating
such a broad conception of causal mechanism ‘may not be desir-
able if it means sacriﬁcing an understanding of the things that
make mechanisms distinctive in particular ﬁelds, such as molecu-
lar biology’. This concern aptly illustrates the danger of vacuity that
arises from formulating exceedingly broad ontic characterizations
of causal mechanisms. Barros (2008) proposes a third solution,
which is to formulate various ontic characterizations of causal
mechanism, among them one which can effectively capture the
causal mechanism of natural selection. The problem with this
strategy is that it means giving up the objective of having a uniﬁed
conception of causal mechanisms that can be used to make gener-
alizations regarding the nature of mechanismic explanations
across biology. In this way, all three proposed solutions are unsat-
isfactory. However, when we adopt an epistemic view of causal
mechanisms, the tensions generated by the efforts to ontically
reconstruct this causal mechanism disappear.15
Some mechanismic philosophers may object that the thesis that
causal mechanisms are epistemic rather than ontic can be refuted
on the grounds that biologists often use ‘mechanism’ to refer to the
causal process itself and not (just) to the explanation of it. In re-
sponse, I would argue that it is very important to understand
why biologists use the term ‘mechanism’ in their research in the
ﬁrst place. The inadvertent conﬂation of the machine mechanism
and causal mechanism senses is once again at the heart of the mat-
ter. Mechanismic philosophers tend to assume that using the term
‘mechanism’ in relation to P (where P is the phenomenon of inter-
est) indicates something distinctive about the nature of P that
motivates and legitimates the use of the word ‘mechanism’ in
the context of its explanation. Although this has indeed been the
case in the past when mechanists conceived organisms and their
parts as machine mechanisms, the ubiquitous appeal to ‘mecha-
nisms’ by the majority of biologists today is no longer determined
by the prescriptive ontological commitments of mechanicism, as I
showed in Section 4. Mechanism-talk in contemporary biology is
simply a contingent product of history, or as Haldane put it, ‘a mere
matter of custom’. Consequently, the use of the word ‘mechanism’
in an ontic sense by some biologists does not demonstrate that15 Kuorikoski (2009) has recently proposed a sort of compromise between ontic and episte
ontic one referring to componential causal systems (like the causal mechanisms of cell bio
mechanism of natural selection). Although I am sympathetic towards this sort of reconstru
together with the broad applicability of an epistemic view, justiﬁes defending a general e
16 In fact, the textbook deﬁnition of ‘mechanism’ that Ramsey cites in his analysis close
organic chemistry, a mechanism ‘is a speciﬁcation, by means of a sequence of elementary
Richardson, 1981, p. 174, my emphasis).causal mechanisms need to be understood as real things. The on-
tic-epistemic dispute concerning the nature of causal mechanisms
will not be settled by simply listing examples of the usage of
‘mechanism’ in the scientiﬁc literature, but by considering how
best to make philosophical sense of the role played by mecha-
nism-talk in scientiﬁc reasoning and explanation.
7. Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to clarify the semantic confusion
surrounding the concept of ‘mechanism’ as it is used in biology. I
have argued that causal mechanisms—the targets of the new
mechanismic program in the philosophy of biology—owe their
ubiquity in contemporary biological explanations to the stunning
successes of mechanistic investigations in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Historically, I have claimed that
the mechanistic conﬁdence during this period that all phenomena
would ultimately be explained in terms of machine mechanisms
caused the term ‘mechanism’ to gradually lose its distinctive
mechanistic connotations, becoming a ‘dead metaphor’ that came
to informally signify a commitment to causal explanation—nomore
and no less. Philosophically, I have argued that judging by the way
biologists today use this notion, causal mechanisms are better
understood as heuristic explanatory devices than as real things in
nature, and that the reason why most mechanismic philosophers
think otherwise is because they inadvertently transpose the ontic
status of machine mechanisms onto their analyses of causal mech-
anisms. I have shown that by conceiving causal mechanisms epi-
stemically it is possible to come to terms with the multitude of
different biological contexts in which they are featured. My exam-
ination has also revealed that biologists today who habitually re-
sort to the concept of ‘mechanism’ in their explanations are not
necessarily mechanists, as the contemporary appeal to mecha-
nism-talk neither entails nor derives from the ontological and epis-
temological commitments of mechanicism. Mechanismic
explanations (i.e., explanations given in terms of causal mecha-
nisms) need not be mechanistic; in fact they often deal with pop-
ulation-level phenomena, such as the causal mechanism of natural
selection.
As my historico-philosophical analysis of the concept of ‘mech-
anism’ has been restricted to biology, it would be interesting to see
whether similar analyses in other sciences support or conﬂict with
the conclusions arrived at here for biology, such as the thesis that
causal mechanisms are explanations rather than real things. Ram-
sey (2008) has recently examined the role of mechanisms in organ-
ic chemistry, and one of his main ﬁndings is that ‘Organic chemists
take mechanisms to be explanations’ (Ramsey, 2008, p. 976) in the
form of ‘inferences based on observational data’ (ibid., p. 972).16
This suggests that the epistemic account of causal mechanisms that
I have defended is probably applicable to other areas of science out-
side of biology. Expanding the range of perspectives on scientiﬁc
practice should help provide further insight into the role played by
the concept of ‘mechanism’ across the sciences.
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